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Introduction 
 Considered one of the most monumental documents in regards to granting equality and 
equity for women, it is hard to believe that the premise of Title IX is summed up in one sentence, 
or 37 words to be exact (Busch 1)-“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.” Because of this 
document, approved by the U.S. Congress on June 23rd, 1972, women gained increasingly more 
opportunities to receive advanced degrees, more employment opportunities, especially in politics 
and higher education, and more chances to participate in athletics (Busch 16). Title IX’s mission 
to eliminate discrimination “on the basis of sex” has remained the same, but its scope has 
continued to expand. Title IX includes stipulations regarding fairness and equality in athletics, as 
well as methods for handling sexual misconduct on college campuses. Each of these facets of 
Title IX received criticism from members of Congress, however, one of Title IX’s most recent 
contentions that this paper will delve into is the inclusion of transgender rights into the 
document. Beginning with the 2016 “Dear Colleague Letter” issued by the Obama 
administration, the letter expanded upon rights they deemed necessary for transgender students 
(Melnick 225). While the Trump administration rescinded this document, it is important to note 
that this letter sparked a nationwide debate regarding the rights of transgender students in 
schools. The initial implementation of the aforementioned 2016 DCL and the controversy 
following it prompts a vital question that this paper will attempt to answer- how far should the 
scope of Title IX extend to include the rights of people who are transgender? This paper will  
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analyze the bathroom debate in regards to transgender students, as well as the athletics debate by 
analyzing the arguments outlined in the court case Soule v. CT Association of Schools. I will also 
discuss in great detail the contentions regarding the definitions of sex versus gender as well as 
differing policies across states, and how these factors have played a huge role in Title IX and 
transgender rights debates. Ultimately, I argue that Title IX must include the rights of transgender 
students in all aspects like facilities and athletics; however, further clarifications and 
recommendations must be addressed. This includes a clearer definition regarding the difference 
between sex and gender, and a more unified national policy on the issue as opposed to leaving 
the inclusion of transgender rights into Title IX up to each U.S. state. 
Sex vs. Gender 
 First, it is important to compare and contrast the definitions of sex and gender, 
particularly in law and the court systems, since this contention plays a huge role in various 
debates regarding transgender rights and Title IX. Throughout the Title IX document, sex and 
gender are used interchangeably. While it is true that in today’s society, our understanding of the 
differences between sex and gender has expanded, for many years, the difference between the 
two terms remained uncontested.  According to R. Shep Melnick, Professor of American Politics, 
on page 227 of The Transformation of Title IX, “from 1972 through 2010-neither OCR nor 
federal courts interpreted Title IX to address discrimination on the basis of gender identity.” 
Additionally, Melnick addresses the fact that “almost no one had given any thought to the 
difference between “sex”— that is, the anatomical differences between male and female—and 
“gender identity”—that is, “an individual’s internal sense of gender” (227). Prior court decisions,  
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particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, tended to prioritize the definition of sex as opposed to 
gender identity. During these years, Melnick says that “the courts heard a handful of cases 
pertaining to Title VII (of the 1964 Civil Rights Act which prohibited employment 
discrimination, and is considered a precedent to Title IX). These “employment discrimination 
cases were brought by transgender plaintiffs, but judges invariably held that federal law bans 
only discrimination based on sex, not gender identity” (Melnick 227).  
 However, Melnick explains that around the year 2000, a shift occurred within the federal 
courts. Instead of relying solely on a rigid definition of sex, the federal courts “held that firing or 
refusing to hire an individual because that person’s gender identity diverges from his or her 
biological sex constitutes a form of “sexual stereotyping” prohibited by Title VII” (Melnick 227).  
This decision emerged from a “plurality opinion” that the “Supreme Court announced in 
1989” (Melnick 227). The plurality opinion stems from the court case Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins. In this case, “four members of the Court agreed that failure to promote a woman for not 
acting in a sufficiently “lady-like” fashion constitutes sex discrimination” (Melnick 227). 
Therefore, rather than merely determining if discrimination occurred on the basis of an 
individual’s biological sex, the term sexual stereotyping emerged as a way to prohibit 
discrimination based on traits or characteristics. This case concluded that an employer would 
violate Title VII “if that employer’s decisions were the product of sex stereotyping or were likely 
influenced by sex stereotyping” (Melnick 227). Melnick says on page 227 of The Transformation 
of Title IX that “Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men 
and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” The case itself made no mention of sexual  
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orientation or gender identity, yet, the wording of the plurality opinion suggests that gender 
nonconforming employees cannot be subject to adverse employment action simply because they 
refuse to conform to “sex stereotypes” (Melnick 227). These sex stereotypes include, but are not 
limited to, a man wearing a dress, or desiring to use she/her pronouns (Melnick 227). 
 This was only the beginning of the sex versus gender debate in the court system. On page 
228 of The Transformation of Title IX, Melnick addresses key moments in Title IX history as it 
relates to transgender students- 
Table 12-1 Transgender Chronology  
1975  The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s Title IX regulations authorize 
schools to provide “separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex” as long 
as they are of comparable quality  
1980s  Most federal courts find that Title VII does not cover gender identity or sexual 
orientation  
1989  Plurality decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins holds that employers violate Title VII if 
their decisions are “the product of sex stereotyping”  
2000s  Relying on language in Price Waterhouse, most federal courts find that Title VII 
prohibits employment discrimination based on gender identification and sexual orientation  
2007  Rep. Barney Frank introduces the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, which would 
amend Title VII to cover discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity  
2010  Dear Colleague Letter on bullying covers bullying based on gender identity; OCR begins 
to investigate complaints about schools’ treatment of transgender students  
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2012  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission rules that Title VII covers employment 
discrimination against transgender applicants (Macy v. Holder)  
2013  OCR’s agreement with Acadia Unified School District allows transgender students to use 
bathrooms matching their gender identity  
2014  President Obama issues executive order prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender 
identity by federal contractors I 
n two sets of “Questions and Answers” OCR states that Title IX covers some forms of 
discrimination based on transgender status  
Attorney General Holder changes the position of the Department of Justice (DOJ), declaring that 
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on gender identity  
2015  Ferg-Cadima letter states that OCR policy with regard to sex-segregated facilities is that 
schools must “treat transgender students consistent with their gender identity”  
2016  Fourth Circuit defers to OCR’s transgender policy in G. G. v. Gloucester County School 
Board  
OCR and DOJ issue their transgender DCL 
DOJ sues North Carolina over its bathroom bill; North Carolina countersues, challenging the 
legality of the DCL Supreme Court grants certiorari in G. G. v. Gloucester County School Board 
Federal district court in Texas rules that the DCL violates Title IX and issues nationwide 
injunction stopping its enforcement  
2017 DOJ withdraws DCL; Supreme Court sends G. G. back to the Fourth Circuit Seventh 
Circuit finds that both Title VII and Title IX cover discrimination based on gender identity, and  
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require schools to allow students to choose sex-segregated facilities that match their gender 
identity 
 Thus, the competing definitions of sex and gender have been heavily contested 
throughout time. But, these debates allowed transgender rights to be addressed, and the term “sex 
stereotyping” to prevail as a means of employment discrimination. While Title VII originally did 
not protect transgender individuals, Congress worked to add legislation to Title VII that would 
protect individuals based on gender identity. However, this protection did not come to fruition 
until June 15th 2020, where “the Supreme Court ruled in Bostock v. Clayton County, 
Georgia that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects employees from discrimination 
based on their sexual orientation and gender identity” (scotusblog.com). Despite multiple 
attempts to add protections for transgender individuals, this decision was still met with 
disagreements and contentions from various different outlets. This is particularly seen with the 
bathroom and athletics debates, which are particularly highlighted in the Obama administration’s 
2016 Dear Colleague Letter.  
 As mentioned previously, nationwide discussions about Title IX were particularly 
heightened with the Obama administration’s 2016 Dear Colleague Letter, which was “issued by 
OCR and the Department of Justice (DOJ)” and specifically addressed the rights of transgender 
students (Melnick 226). This letter called for various expansions for transgender students, which 
included “access to bathrooms, locker rooms, showers, and overnight accommodations on the 
basis of students’ gender identity as opposed to their biological sex” (Melnick 226). This DCL 
really focused on respecting a student’s gender identity, and, according to Melnick, “insisted that  
Bianca 10 
respecting the identity of transgender students must take priority over responding to other 
students’ concerns about privacy and safety” (226). Despite concerns with safety and privacy, the 
DCL said that these concerns “cannot justify a policy that denies transgender students the right to 
choose the sex-segregated facilities they will use, the sports teams on which they will play, and 
their preferred names and pronouns” (Melnick 226). Even though the intent of the OCR involved 
creating a safe space for transgender students, anger and discontent still surrounded the core 
tenants of the 2016 DCL. 
The Bathroom Debate and Title IX 
 An important example of the bathroom debate to analyze happened in North Carolina, 
which occurred only a couple months prior to the announcement of the 2016 DCL. In March of 
2016, the North Carolina General Assembly passed the “Public Facilities Privacy and Security 
Act, which was the first state law in the United States to address transgender access to 
restrooms” (Barnett 2). This law prioritized biological sex over gender identity, emphasizing 
“that individuals must use the restroom that corresponds with the designated sex listed on their 
birth certificates when in government buildings, such as schools” (Barnett 2). The Public 
Facilities Privacy and Security Act was actually a response to Ordinance 7056, which was passed 
only a month earlier. This ordinance was quite the opposite of the act since it “prohibited 
discrimination against homosexual and transgender individuals within the city (Charlotte, North 
Carolina)” (Barnett 2). This ordinance prioritized gender over sex since it “allowed individuals to 
use the restrooms that correspond to their gender identity, rather than their biological 
sex” (Barnett 2). 
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 The passing of the Public Facilities Privacy and Security Act gained nationwide attention 
since the Justice Department said that North Carolina’s law “violated federal civil-rights 
laws” (Gersen 1). However, North Carolina’s governor, Pat McCrory, “responded with a lawsuit, 
asking a court to declare that the state’s law doesn’t violate those federal laws. Meanwhile, in a 
suit filed on the same day, the Justice Department asked a court to say that it does” (Gersen 1). 
This issue then became exasperated by the 2016 DCL because it explicitly stated that 
“transgender students must be allowed to use restrooms that are consistent with their gender 
identity” (Gersen 1). If schools did not comply, then they risked losing their federal funding from 
Title IX (Gersen 1). When making its case against North Carolina, “the Justice Department 
explained that if non-transgender people may use bathrooms consistent with their gender 
identity, then denying transgender people access consistent with their gender identity constitutes 
discrimination on the basis of sex” (Gersen 1). This is also highlighted in the Dear Colleague 
Letter, which emphasizes how important it is that schools “treat a student’s gender identity as a 
student’s sex for the purposes of Title IX” (Gersen 1). This ultimately prompts an intriguing 
question that relates to the definitions of sex and gender- if, by society’s definitions of these 
terms, they are not the same, then should they be treated as the same? If they are not the same, is 
it fair for the 2016 DCL to conflate the terms for the purposes of Title IX? While I argue that the 
scope of Title IX should expand to include the rights of all transgender individuals in order for 
their human rights to be fully realized, further clarifications regarding the definitions of sex and 
gender must be addressed. Merely conflating the two for policy reasons is not sufficient because 
it gives room for schools or other venues to argue that since sex and gender are different, then  
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why should they treat them as the same? The 2016 DCL should have defined both sex and 
gender, and explained why it is important that schools use gender identity to determine which 
bathroom students should use.  
 At the time, there were two ways schools could comply with the bathroom policy under 
Title IX. The first method is simply allowing students to choose which bathrooms, locker rooms, 
or other facilities they desired to use (Gersen 2). Schools would also be in compliance if they 
chose to desegregate some, if not all of their bathrooms (Gersen 2). The desegregation of 
bathrooms evolved into a common practice at certain colleges, with some universities making 
“every bathroom on campus open to any gender” (Gersen 2). Gersen, a professor at Harvard Law 
School, believes that “this solution could well become a practical choice at K-12 public 
schools” (2). Nevertheless, these methods of inclusion were met with concerns, particularly from  
female students. Gersen explains how there is “a growing sense that some females will not feel 
safe sharing bathrooms, shower rooms, or locker rooms with males (2). Gersen discusses that 
this is not a hypothetical concern, since this kind of situation happened at Brandeis University. 
The school “found a male student responsible for sexual misconduct for looking at his 
boyfriend’s genitals while both were using a communal school shower” (Gersen 2). After this 
incident, “the disciplined student then sued the school for denying him basic fairness in its 
disciplinary process, and a federal court recently refused to dismiss the suit” (Gersen 2). While a 
situation like this one can occur, I do not believe it is related specifically to transgender 
individuals. Is it not possible that this situation could occur with male identifying or even female 
identifying students that are not transgender? Regardless of biological sex or gender identity, the  
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situation is still abhorrent and wrong. However, I believe it is unfair to discriminate against a 
transgender individual for a situation that has to do with the morale of a person, not necessarily 
their gender identity. Brian Barnett, a psychiatrist, analyzed this exact issue regarding the 
bathroom debate and subsequently wrote an article about it for The Journal of the American 
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law. He concluded that he was “unaware of any studies 
assessing the relationship between transgender identity and perpetration of sexual 
crimes” (Barnett 15). But it is important to note that “studies have consistently replicated the 
finding that transgender individuals are often victims of sexual assault” (Barnett 15). The statistic 
is that, in 2015, about half of transgender individuals were assaulted at one point in their lives 
(Barnett 15). Therefore, even though there are no existing studies about the correlation between 
gender identity and sexual crimes, if almost half of transgender individuals have been assaulted, 
does that not point to a much larger problem of safety for transgender individuals, as opposed to 
worrying if they will commit a sexual crime?  
 Another issue that Barnett addresses in his work is the question of sexual predators- will 
they take advantage of desegregated bathrooms to harm others, including minors? While this 
question pervaded the media, Barnett explains that studies “revealed that only a small number of 
cases actually involved perpetrators who were transgender, perpetrators who falsely claimed to 
be transgender, or perpetrators who attempted to disguise themselves as a member of the 
opposite sex to gain restroom access” (16). Again, while sexual misconduct cannot occur under 
any circumstances, the aforementioned studies show that desegregated bathrooms will not cause 
a huge uprising in sexual crimes.  
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 North Carolina’s Public Facilities Privacy and Security Act sparked national debates not 
only about bathrooms, but regarding what sex and gender truly meant, as well as the scope of 
Title IX policy. Based on the aforementioned statistics and evidence, I believe it is important for 
Title IX to extend all rights to transgender individuals, including the right to choose facilities 
based on gender identity. However, as I previously stated, the 2016 DCL only said schools 
should use gender identity in these matters, without giving a clear explanation of the difference 
between biological sex and gender identity, and why the use of gender identity should prevail. 
Even though the Trump administration ultimately rescinded the 2016 DCL, I believe that during 
its inception, it should have specified the difference between sex and gender, as well as sexual 
stereotyping which, according to Melnick, “can include virtually all conventional thinking about 
sex and gender” (240). Melnick agrees that there is a difference between sex and gender. 
However, he also argues that there needs to be a better understanding regarding this difference 
when he says “outmoded stereotypes about “masculinity and femininity”—based as they are on a 
mistaken bimodal, biological understanding of gender—should be replaced by an understanding 
that recognizes both the fluidity and the socially constructed nature of gender” (Melnick 240). 
Therefore, Title IX policy needs to include the understanding society has now of sex and gender, 
and allow these definitions to guide its legislation. The 2016 DCL had good intentions for the 
inclusion of transgender rights and to shut down discriminatory laws, like the one from North 
Carolina. Alas, it failed to provide a clear understanding of the importance of gender identity, 
which is vital for the concept of transgender rights. Even though the bathroom debate became 
heavily contested, my opinion still stands that desegregated bathrooms are important to include  
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in Title IX legislation, since, in the words of former OCR Assistant Secretary Catherine Lhamon 
“The bathroom question never was just about a bathroom. It is about who that child is at school 
and how that child will be perceived and seen” (Melnick 240). 
The Athletics Debate and Transgender Rights 
 Another key Title IX issue that is vital to analyze in the context of transgender rights is 
athletics. This is another heavily debated area in regards to Title IX and its scope. Some 
individuals say that, based on the language in Title IX policy, transgender students are covered 
under it, and should be allowed to play on a team or compete in a category that is consistent with 
their gender identity. However, others say that allowing transgender athletes to compete in 
categories consistent with their gender identity is actually a violation of Title IX because it takes 
away opportunities from biological females. These were the arguments of the plaintiffs and 
defendants respectfully in the court case Soule v. CT Association of Schools. I took particular 
interest in this case because not only does it highlight the various contentions with transgender 
athletes, but, as a lifelong Connecticut resident, I thought I could analyze it with a unique lens. I 
knew I would have an understanding of the geographic area, as well as information regarding the 
people, socio-economic background of the era, and other factors that could help inform my 
analysis.  
The Plaintiffs- Soule v. CT Association of Schools 
 First, I will analyze the arguments of the Plaintiffs in the Soule case. The premise of the 
case concerns three girls (born female) in high school, who compete in track and field in the girls 
category. The three girls took issue with the new Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference  
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(CIAC) policy, which “is permitting boys who are male in every biological respect to compete in 
girls’ athletic competitions if they claim a female gender identity” (2). The Plaintiffs argue that 
this policy has allowed biological males to “displace” them at track competitions in Connecticut, 
which has excluded them “from honors, opportunities to compete at higher levels, and public 
recognition critical to college recruiting and scholarship opportunities that should go to those 
outstanding female athletes” (2). The Plaintiffs concluded that CIAC’s new policy actually 
discriminates against girls and violates Title IX, since Title IX promotes equal opportunities for 
females, and this situation allows transgender females to prevail more often than biological 
females (3). The Plaintiffs focus heavily on the biological differences between males and 
females, saying on page 12 of the court brief that “victory over comparably talented and trained 
male athletes is impossible for girls and women in the vast majority of athletic competitions, 
because of inherent and biologically dictated differences between the sexes.” This includes the 
testosterone levels of males who hit puberty as well, which is said to “give males a powerful 
physiological athletic advantage over females” (12), and allows them to “consistently achieve 
records 10-20% higher than comparably fit and trained women across almost all athletic 
events” (14). The Plaintiffs also claim that “increasing numbers of males are in fact competing in 
girls' and women’s events each year, girls are in fact losing, and males are seizing one “girls’” or 
“women’s” championship and record after another” (21). Pages 25 and 26 consist of tables with 
results from the 2017 women’s outdoor track 100 meter and 200 meter competitions. The winner 
of both races was Andraya Yearwood, a transgender female. She won the 100 meter race with a 
time of 12.66 seconds, with the second place winner, a biological female, finishing at 12.83  
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seconds. In the 200 meter race, Andraya won first with a time of 26.08 seconds, with the second 
place winner, a biological female, finishing at 26.38 seconds. The Plaintiffs highlight the fact that 
in these instances, only two people could qualify for the state championships, so with Andraya 
winning both categories, she therefore took the opportunity away from a biological female. They 
also address a similar instance with a transgender female named Terry Miller, who won various 
races, thus, beating all the other biological females in the category. Ultimately, the Plaintiffs 
desire for a declaration and injunctive relief from the Defendants that says they violated Title IX 
because they have not provided “equal treatment, benefits, and opportunities for girls in all 
athletic competitions” (49). The Plaintiffs also wanted the Defendants “to remove times achieved 
by male athletes from any records purporting to record times achieved by girls or women” as 
well as any victories obtained by transgender females (50).  
 While I will further analyze the implications of each argument as far as Title IX in later 
paragraphs, and provide additional insights, I will first express my thoughts regarding the 
Plaintiffs’ argument. I agree that there are undeniable biological differences between a male and 
female, and that these biological differences, whether it is increased male testosterone levels 
during puberty or wider hips and gained weight in females during puberty, have the potential to 
impact athletic ability (13). The Plaintiffs provide evidence of this as well on page 13, outlining 
how males will have larger hearts, lungs, and muscle fibers, which can be advantageous in the 
athletic realm. However, evidence to support their claims were not always clear. One particular 
instance of this is on page 21, which says that an increasing amount of males are competing in 
female categories. This claim can potentially be true. However, there is no evidence in the brief  
Bianca 18 
that states where this information was obtained. How can one know if an increasing amount of 
biological males are competing in the girls category if there is no clear evidence proving this 
claim? Again, while I believe this claim is not impossible, a little more evidence would have 
been helpful since their argument states that Title IX took opportunities away from biological 
females. Additionally, while the time tables served as a helpful guide to see where transgender 
females were placing in comparison to biological females, at some points, biological females 
were actually faster than transgender females or did not have times that were incrementally 
slower than transgender females specifically. For example, on page 25, in the 2017 CIAC Class 
M Women’s outdoor track competition on May 30th, 2017, Andraya Yearwood won at 12.66 
seconds, with Kate Hall, a biological female, coming in second at 12.83 seconds. The difference 
between the two was 0.17 seconds. However the margin between the 3rd and 4th place finishers, 
both biological females, was 0.23 seconds, a slightly larger margin than Andraya and Kate. 
Therefore, this means that the margin of time between Andraya and Kate was not as statistically 
significant as the Plaintiffs tried to claim,, since the 3rd and 4th place finishers had a larger 
margin of time between them, and they are both biological females. In the table on page 27, 
which was also a 100 meter race but occurred on June 5th, 2017, Andraya actually finished 3rd. 
Two biological females ultimately had faster times than she did. While the Plaintiffs are arguing 
that Andraya’s victories are qualifying her to advance to state championships, and thus, taking 
that opportunity away from biological females, it is important to note that Andraya’s times are 
not always significantly faster than biological females. I believe, based on the evidence the 
Plaintiffs presented, that Andraya’s placement does certainly take away a spot in the state  
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championships for a biological female. However, whether this negatively impacts biological 
females enough to violate Title IX remains unclear in this argument, but it is what the 
Defendants attempt to address in their brief.  
The Defendants- Soule v. CT Association of Schools 
 The Defendants want the court to dismiss the case entirely. As far as articulating their 
argument, first, they claim on page 8 that “Soule identifies only one instance in which she was 
allegedly denied an athletic opportunity as a result of competing against either Andraya or 
Terry.” This instance occurred during the 2019 indoor track season, where “Soule competed 
against Andraya and Terry in the 55m dash at the State Open Championship” (8). According to 
the brief, the three individuals competed in a race to determine who would advance to the state 
championships. “Terry had the fastest time and Andraya had the second-fastest, while Soule had 
the eighth-fastest time—behind Terry, Andraya and five other, non-transgender girls—and 
therefore failed to qualify for the final 55m championship race” (8). Because of this instance, 
Soule said that if Andraya and Terry did not compete in this race, then “she would have placed 
sixth, and would therefore have been eligible to compete in the final heat for a spot at the New 
England Championship” (8). While the brief expresses that this opportunity was taken away 
from Soule, on page 9, it emphasizes that Soule had “other opportunities” to compete at the New 
England Championships, with events like the long jump and relay. The Defendants then go on to 
explain that the other Plaintiffs, besides Soule, only demonstrated one opportunity that was lost 
to them, even though they had other opportunities with other competitions (10). The Defendants 
made various other claims as well to articulate their argument. On page 14, the Defendants say  
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that the Plaintiffs do not have a sufficient claim for declaratory or injunctive relief, since, in 
order for this to occur, they have to meet three elements, which the Defendants claim they did 
not meet:  
 “First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally   
 protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not 
 conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury 
 and the conduct complained of . . . [and] Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely  
 speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision” (14).    
 Thus, there was no evidence of an injury that could warrant injunctive relief, according to 
the Defendants. Additionally, they say that the claim the Plaintiffs make regarding the superior 
athletic abilities of transgender females may not be the case. This is because it is unclear if 
Andraya and Terry had puberty blockers, which would mean that they would not have 
experienced a typical male puberty (23). Ultimately, the Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs are 
the ones who would be in violation of Title IX. The definition of sex emerges again as a 
contested definition, since the Plaintiffs define sex based on biological traits, but the Defendants 
believe “the plain meaning of “sex” refers more generally to “the properties or characteristics by 
which individuals may be classified as male or female” Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. 
Supp. 3d 509, 526 (D. Conn. 2016). They claim the characteristics of sex reach beyond 
“chromosomes or another singular biological trait; instead, they also include hormonal, 
anatomical, reproductive, and social elements” (25). The brief goes on to explain that banning 
transgender females from participating in the girls category at competitions would be  
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discriminatory. This is based on precedents from prior court decisions that extended the 
definition of sex to include characteristics and sex stereotyping, not just biological factors (28). 
Additionally, on page 32, the Defendants apply the three part test to prove that schools were 
actually in compliance with Title IX stipulations. The three part test was established in 1979 in 
order to see if schools were in compliance with providing effective accommodation for women 
in athletics. The following aspects of the three part test are outlined on page 32 of the brief-  
 1. Whether participation opportunities are provided to males and females in numbers  
 substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; 
  2. If one sex is underrepresented in sports, whether the institution can show a history and  
 continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the  
 developing interest[s] and abilities of the members of that sex, or, 
 3. If one sex is underrepresented, whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and  
 abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the  
 present program. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 92–93. 
 The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs’ argument is under the presumption that effective 
accommodation under Title IX has to include sex-separated teams, which, they assert, does not. 
Therefore, the Defendants claim that allowing transgender athletes to compete on women’s 
teams would still be acceptable under Title IX, and they would not have a viable claim “unless 
they can show that they do not possess sufficient skill “to compete actively” alongside girls who 
are transgender” (35). Another important argument in this brief occurs on page 37. While the 
Plaintiffs asserted that they could not win with transgender females competing, the Defendants  
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state otherwise. A few tables on page 37 highlights both indoor and outdoor track championships 
from recent years, and shows that the Plaintiffs each had two wins in each year since 2017 
(excluding 2020 since no season was held because of the COVID-19 pandemic). Terry also had 
two wins in each competition in every year, while Andraya had zero. The Defendants claim that 
these tables show that the Plaintiffs were able to “effectively compete right alongside both Terry 
and Andraya” (37). A couple final key arguments I will highlight from this brief is that the 
Defendants cite several other cases that shows that “Title IX does not expressly and 
unequivocally provide for a definition of sex that would preclude transgender girls from 
participating in sex-separated girls’ teams (44). Therefore, with this in mind, the Defendants 
argue that the “Plaintiffs fail to identify any text within Title IX, its implementing regulations, or 
Department of Education policy statements… that [shows] Title IX bars girls who are 
transgender from participating in athletics with other girls (44)” Also, the Defendants emphasize 
that under the court case Pennhurst, “schools cannot be held liable for damages under such an 
unprecedented and unsupported legal theory” (44). With all the aforementioned factors in mind, 
the Defendants called for the dismissal of this case. 
 The Defendants make very interesting points. As far as athletic opportunity, I believe the 
Defendants made a clearer point, because they said that despite Andraya and Terry qualifying to 
advance while biological females did not, the biological females still had other opportunities to 
excel. This included other categories besides running, like the long jump. Therefore, 
opportunities to advance were still present, which I believe addresses part three of the three part 
test of Title IX, which is that it “can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the  
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members of that sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present 
program” (32). If both the Plaintiffs and transgender females still had several opportunities to 
advance to further championships, then would they not have been “fully and effectively 
accommodated?” Additionally, the tables on page 37 that showed the various wins the Plaintiffs, 
Terry, and Andraya each had was helpful, although, I will say that further clarification would 
have been more effective. While the competitions where the wins occurred were justified, it was 
unclear which categories were won. While the Defendants explain that some races were 
individual and some were relays, and while it can show that the Plaintiffs could effectively 
compete alongside Andraya and Terry, I believe the Plaintiffs could still come back with another 
argument. Their argument could potentially state that Andraya and Terry still bested them in 
individual competitions, so the Plaintiffs can possibly say that they were not accommodated in 
individual races. Even though the table with the number of wins was helpful, further 
clarifications regarding which races were won or lost would have provided more insight, and 
would have presented more evidence to support their argument.  
Implications for Title IX 
 Both arguments have various implications for Title IX. While the Defendants do argue 
that the scope of the meaning of sex has expanded based on various preceding court cases, it 
elicits the question of sex versus gender once again. In future Title IX legislation, particularly 
athletics in this instance, should the definition of sex be expanded or should it completely change 
to gender identity? In my opinion, I believe there is a difference between biological sex and 
gender identity, so in order to fully include transgender rights into Title IX legislation, a  
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systematic shift should be made to gender identity. While some legal precedents may have, in the 
Defendants’ opinion, expanded the definition of sex, even if the definitions keep evolving, is it 
not still possible that people could still make a case that Title IX should include a more limited 
scope for “on the basis of sex?” This is exactly what happened during the transfer of the Obama 
administration to the Trump administration. The Trump administration rolled back the 2016 
DCL, which, as stated previously, urged schools to use “gender identity” as opposed to sex. The 
Trump administration then leaned towards Title IX’s original wording “on the basis of sex,” 
interpreting this stance as one’s biological sex (Battle 1). Therefore, in order to avoid these 
contentions, Title IX legislation should be consistent with their definitions as opposed to relying 
on the continuous expansion of the scope of the meaning of sex.  
 In the case of athletics, I prefer the meaning and usage of gender identity, because if sex 
is limited to the biological realm, then it can negatively impact transgender students, ultimately 
discriminating against them. Thus, after a careful analysis of both arguments, I not only agree 
with the Defendants, but in my opinion, they articulated their argument much more effectively. 
While I believe they should have detailed the types of races won by the Plaintiffs or Andraya and 
Terry, those tables did show that it is not always a guarantee that a transgender female will beat a 
biological female. They make the case that to assume this presumption would be discriminatory, 
and is not a solid, legal basis for not allowing transgender females to compete with biological 
females, to which I agree. Additionally, the Defendants addressed the three part test, which the 
Plaintiffs did not. Schools only have to meet one aspect of the three part test, and I believe the 
Defendants proved that the Plaintiffs did not have a viable claim under the third part of the test,  
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which, once again, states- “if one sex is underrepresented, whether it can be demonstrated that 
the interests and abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and effectively 
accommodated by the present program” (32). The Defendants claim that the Plaintiffs assume 
that teams must be sex segregated in order to meet effective accommodation. However, this is 
not the case, since the Defendants cite various precedents on page 34 where “courts have 
recognized that allowing girls to play on boys’ teams (and vice versa) can sometimes be the only 
effective way to provide equal athletic opportunity under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Again, 
according to the Defendants, this means that the “Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for denial of 
effective accommodation unless they can show that they do not possess sufficient skill “to 
compete actively” alongside girls who are transgender” (35). Thus, since the Defendants further 
explain how a couple of the Plaintiffs actually beat Andraya or Terry in some instances, it shows 
that effective accommodation would not be necessary under Title IX since they competed 
alongside Andraya and Terry with no issues. While the Plaintiffs do make a solid point that there 
are undeniable biological differences between the sexes, like the Defendants stated, merely 
assuming that transgender females will win because of assumed biological differences is not 
enough to claim that they are taking away opportunities from biological females. I say 
“assumed” here because the Defendants additionally discuss how it is unknown if transgender 
females actually went through a typical male puberty that would grant them superior abilities 
over biological females (23). Thus, discriminating against transgender females on the sole 
assumption of biological abilities would actually violate Title IX, because it would not provide 
effective accommodation for transgender females. They may actually be at a disadvantage  
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competing against males who went through a normal puberty, especially if the transgender 
females took puberty blockers. How to determine how much of a typical male puberty a 
transgender female athlete went through may be hard to measure, however, allowing them to 
compete with other females has proven to not create significant barriers and did not cause a loss 
of numerous opportunities for the Plaintiffs. As I addressed before, while Title IX should expand 
its scope to gender identity in order to avoid conflicts with the definition of sex, even despite this 
definition, the Plaintiffs still had equitable opportunities under Title IX, particularly 
demonstrated by the three part test. But, further distinction between biological sex and gender 
identity will be helpful to clarify future Title IX cases. Additionally, as I will explain next, it is 
important that there is a uniform federal policy that all schools adhere to, instead of some states 
choosing to allow transgender athletes to compete with biological females while others do not. 
Separative State Policies 
  Lack of uniformity among states is very problematic, because while some states 
prioritize the inclusivity of transgender students, others do not. However, this is also due to the 
Trump administration’s ambiguous policies. While the 2016 DCL under the Obama 
administration called for the use of students’ gender identity in the case of determining which 
facilities to use and athletic competitions to compete in, the Trump administration took a 
different approach. They not only rescinded the DCL and stuck with Title IX’s original “on the 
basis of sex” decision, but they also left policies up to individual states. This meant that in some 
states, transgender athletes could compete in the same category as biological females, but in 
other states, this was not the case. 
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 According to transathletes.com, different high schools have varying policies for 
transgender athletes. The states are split up into four color categories. If the state is green, it 
means its policies are friendly towards transgender athletes. Blue states require “medical proof or 
invasive disclosures.” Red states are deemed as “discriminatory state guidance that includes 
multiple harmful components” and black means that states have no guidance for this subject. 
There are numerous interesting points of analysis for these policies. First, it is important to note 
that these are the policies as of 2020, meaning that states are still operating under these statutes. 
Secondly, it is intriguing to look at the geography of the policies. States on the Pacific coast like 
California, Washington, and Oregon are green states, with the same being true for northeastern 
states, like Connecticut, New York, Massachusetts, and New Jersey (transatheltes.com). Many of 
the red states are southern states, like Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Georgia 
(transathletes.com). While the geography of these policies may seem trivial, it holds great 
significance for the treatment of transgender athletes. Despite some border states having similar 
policies, some states actually border each other, but have completely opposite policies. 
 This is exemplified by Colorado and New Mexico. Colorado is green, while New Mexico 
is red. Colorado’s policy states that students can use their gender identity to determine which 
category they compete in during athletic competitions. However, New Mexico’s policy states 
that “students are required to compete in the gender listed on their original or amended birth 
certificate” (transathletes.com). How can two states in the same country be so close 
geographically, but differ immensely when it comes to their transgender athletic policy? While 
this depends on many factors, such as governors and people in political power in those states, it  
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is still fascinating to see how despite a shared border, policy can be so vastly different. This is 
similar for other states too, like Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. Both Alabama and Georgia are 
red states, with Alabama determining an athlete’s eligible status “by the gender indicated on the 
student-athlete’s certified certificate of birth” and Georgia interpreting gender as “determined by 
the gender noted on his/her birth certificate” (transathletes.com). Both of these states border 
Florida, however, Florida is a green state and has a much different policy than Alabama and 
Georgia. Florida’s policy states that "all eligible students should have the opportunity to 
participate in interscholastic athletics in a manner that is consistent with their gender identity and 
expression, irrespective of the gender listed on a student’s birth certificate and/or 
records” (transathletes.com). This is another example of how states can border each other, but 
have completely different perspectives on transgender athletes. This difference in policy prompts 
a couple important questions. First, it is interesting that these policies use the term gender 
identity, but also use the term gender alone, pertaining to the gender listed on an athlete’s birth 
certificate. I wondered why no reference to sex was made here, and what each state’s stance was 
on the difference between sex and gender, since that is important when distinguishing and 
defining transgender policies. Additionally, I wondered what would happen, for example, if a 
transgender athlete competed in Florida, but earned a high enough placement to advance to a 
competition taking place in Alabama or Georgia. Could they compete in the same category they 
competed in for Florida, or would they have to switch categories when competing in Alabama or 
Georgia? I believe this could cause an abundance of confusion since these states differ vastly 
regarding their policies. Would that mean the transgender athlete’s placement in the Florida  
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competition would not count, and would that mean a biological female or male would compete in 
their place? In my opinion, this would be discriminatory, because if the transgender individual 
won a specific category in one state, should they not be able to compete in that category in 
another state? The transathletes.com website does not give an exact year these policies were in 
place, but rather presents a range: 2013-2020. So much happened nationally within this time 
span, including the transition from the Obama administration to the Trump administration. In 
turn, this resulted in vastly different regulations, most notably, as I have been discussing, the 
2016 DCL and the Trump administration subsequently revoking it. As I have also discussed, the 
2016 DCL prioritized gender identity while the Trump administration rescinded it and returned to 
the original definition of “on the basis of sex,” which also left policies up to local schools and 
states. So, in this case, would red states have been out of compliance with Title IX during the 
time of the 2016 DCL? While they may currently be in compliance with Title IX now in 2020, 
could red state policies have been viewed as discriminatory during 2016? I believe they could 
have if federal regulations specified the use of gender identity when determining the usage of 
facilities and teams athletes would compete under. If this was the case, I also wonder why states 
were not held accountable for Title IX compliance during this time. 
 This is precisely why having transgender athletic policies vary across different states is 
confusing and discriminatory. For example, a transgender athlete may be led to believe they can 
compete in a category that aligns with their gender identity during a competition after looking at 
the policies in one state, but then realize that their own state has different requirements. This is 
confounding for an athlete, especially if they are not made aware of the policies in their state  
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prior to competing in their competition. This may also not allow them to compete in categories 
aligning with their gender identity in other states, even if they competed differently in their home 
state. This can also lead to confusion not only with categories, but, as I discussed before, with 
prior awards as well. For example, say a transgender female wins her category, but then advances 
to a competition in a state with a different policy- do they forfeit their other placement? 
Additionally, some state policies say that athletes must compete in a category corresponding with 
their assigned gender on their birth certificate. However, as I previously stated throughout this 
paper, there is a blossoming understanding of the distinction between sex and gender- more 
specifically, biological sex and gender identity. So, in this case, gender assigned at birth would 
not necessarily mean the same thing as the gender identity once chooses later on in life. 
Conflating the two can also cause confusion, because gender as many understand it now is a 
social construct, unlike biological sex. Discriminating against someone’s assigned gender in 
athletic competitions proves to not be a solid basis, since just because a gender was assigned at 
birth, it does not mean it is the same as what someone identifies with later in their life. If the 
definition of gender, or sex for that matter, is not uniform nationally, then it leaves room for 
several lawsuits in the realm of transgender athletics simply because of a variation with 
definitions. In order for transgender rights in Title IX to be fully realized, then policies must be 
uniform across the nation as opposed to leaving decisions up to individual states. 
Recommendations for Inclusion 
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 After studying the aforementioned debates regarding transgender rights and Title IX, I 
concocted a few possible solutions as far as effective recommendations for methods of inclusion 
for transgender rights into Title IX policy. 
 First, as I explained and will continue to explain throughout this paper, Title IX needs to 
utilize the term gender identity as opposed to sex in order to be inclusive to all transgender 
individuals. Merely expanding the definition of sex is not sufficient, because people can still 
argue for a more rigid definition and understanding of sex. Scientifically, the understanding of 
biological sex and gender identity has involved tremendously. Thus, Title IX needs to reflect this, 
because just expanding the definition of sex does not encompass the true meaning of what 
transgender individuals need, which is to have access to facilities and teams based on their 
gender identity. After analyzing both the bathroom debate and the athletic debate through CT 
Association of Schools v. Soule, I personally saw no solid basis to keep facilities and teams 
divided solely based on biological sex. Therefore, I propose reinstating the gender identity 
principle of the 2016 DCL, however, I believe there should be more information and clarification 
as well. This includes clarifying the difference between biological sex and gender identity, and 
reiterating that they are not, in fact, the same topic. Having more clarification will allow 
legislators, governments, and schools to fully grasp the concept of gender identity, and know that 
it will not pose any issues, but is rather a step towards inclusion for people who are transgender. 
 Secondly, Title IX policy, especially surrounding transgender rights, needs to be agreed 
upon federally, and not left up to local state governments and schools, like the Trump 
administration proposed. As I explained before, this lack of uniformity can cause confusion  
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among states, especially if a transgender athlete wins a category in their own state, but cannot 
compete in that category in another state because of different guidelines. If Title IX does not 
attack this issue at the federal level, then it will still leave ambiguity among state policies, and 
decisions will depend on how each state decides to interpret the “on the basis of sex” statute. 
Whether they utilize gender identity or revert to a more rigid definition of sex, how far the 
expansion of sex reaches in each state will be debated upon by multiple legislators and advocacy 
groups, each potentially arguing that it is unfair that one state utilizes one policy while the other 
state is different. Thus, to avoid such conflict on both the state and national level, it is important 
that Title IX addresses one uniform policy that states must follow. In the case of inclusion 
regarding the rights of transgender individuals, as I stated earlier, I propose using gender identity 
when determining facilities and athletic teams transgender individuals choose to engage with.  
 When I analyzed the CT Association of Schools v. Soule case, I also discussed the three 
part test Title IX uses to determine whether schools are providing equal opportunities for 
athletics. While I believe that this test also proves that transgender individuals competing on 
athletic teams aligning with their gender identity does not violate Title IX, my third 
recommendation is that Title IX should develop a similar test for facilities. This test can have 
stipulations that determine whether a school is in compliance with transgender rights as far as 
facilities like bathrooms and locker rooms. While I believe more research must be done 
nationally to determine what the exact tenants of this test will look like, I think it is important for 
Congress and other legislators to ask themselves the following questions and research the 
specifics of the following topics: 
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- Should all bathrooms be removed of a specific gender? If some bathrooms remain gendered 
but not all, then what is the exact proportionality of all gender bathrooms that must be in place 
so that it is inclusive enough for students of all genders? This is a central argument that must 
be addressed. I believe there is sufficient evidence to make all bathrooms inclusive, since 
there have been very few instances of sexual crimes relating to transgender individuals or 
people claiming to be transgender as perpetuators. However, if it is not the case that all 
bathrooms become inclusive of all genders, then Congress must determine the proportionality 
of all gender bathrooms so that it matches the number of transgender or non-binary students 
and employees attending or working at a specific school. I believe setting a baseline for at 
least one gender inclusive bathroom is important as well, since this will ensure that regardless 
if there is only one student or employee who is transgender or gender non-binary, they will 
still feel included knowing there is a gender inclusive bathroom. While schools should allow 
individuals to just choose a bathroom based on their gender identity, having desegregated 
bathrooms is an important topic of discussion regarding inclusion for all students and 
employees.  
- How should locker room accommodations operate? While I believe it is important for a 
student to select a locker room based on their gender identity, it is also vital that the needs of 
other students are considered as well, in order to provide a space that takes into account the 
concerns of all students in an equitable manner. It is important that Congress addresses and 
creates a balance for these concerns. Whether this includes a couple different locker rooms 
that do not display the typical boy/girl binary, or the expansion of current locker rooms to  
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create enough room for other students are all factors to consider. This is in order for transgender 
students to still choose a locker room based on their gender identity, however, it allows for 
additional accommodations to be considered as well to provide safety and comfort to all 
students, whether they are transgender, non-binary, or cisgender.        
 While other factors may be taken into consideration when developing this test, I believe 
the development itself will allow states and schools to be held accountable regarding transgender 
rights with bathrooms, locker rooms, and other facilities. Having a solidified test will also be 
useful for court cases as well, since this test’s development would mean that there would be a 
legal precedent regarding transgender inclusiveness with facilities, which would be helpful when 
determining a court decision on a case. Thus, these recommendations are just a few solutions to 
aid Title IX in becoming more inclusive of transgender individuals. It will provide several 
clarifications as well regarding the definitions of sex and gender, state versus federal policy, and 
further clarification for facilities under Title IX, which is similar to the test for athletics.  
Relation to Other Documents 
 It is also important to analyze if transgender rights appear in other documents, clauses 
and amendments to help inform the function of Title IX policy. First, I looked at the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to see if it explicitly mentioned transgender rights. After 
analyzing all of the articles, I thought it was interesting that there is no explicit mention of the 
term transgender in the UDHR. For instance, in Article 2 of the UDHR, it says “everyone is 
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social  
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origin, property, birth or other status.” I thought it was particularly interesting that the document 
used the term sex with no mention of gender. This relates back to the difference between sex and 
gender, however, I am assuming that people viewed sex and gender as very similar if not the 
same during this time, considering that the UDHR was written in 1948, when gender roles were 
fairly pronounced and rigid. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see the prioritization of the term sex 
over gender. This has vital implications for Title IX policy, because if documents like the UDHR 
are prioritizing the term sex, it does not leave as much room for transgender rights to flourish. 
Therefore, it is important that Title IX shifts from “the basis of sex” to gender identity in order to 
be inclusive towards transgender individuals. Even though some prior court case decisions have 
agreed on expanding the definition of sex for the sake of Title IX, how sex and gender are 
understood now scientifically and socially is paramount, especially for rights relating to 
transgender individuals and Title IX.  
 While transgender rights are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, some say that a 
couple of the amendments contain wording that has the ability to protect transgender individuals. 
These two amendments are the First and Fourteenth Amendments. A part of the Bill of Rights, 
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states-  
 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the  
 free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or the press; or the right of the  
 people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of   
 grievances” (U.S. Const. amend. I).  
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According to the National Center for Transgender Equality, they argue that the language in this 
amendment “provides protection for transgender individuals to display their gender expression 
publicly and to dress in respect to their identified gender (National Center for Transgender 
Equality, 2018). While this amendment protects outward gender expression, the center says that 
they also have a “right to privacy” so they can choose to not “disclose their gender identity 
publicly” (5). While I can personally understand how transgender individuals can freely make 
speeches about their gender identity, or freely assemble in protest, there are still some scenarios I 
am unsure about. For example, if a transgender female dressed according to their gender identity, 
then are they still protected under the First Amendment? I also find no instances of language that 
protects transgender individuals’ rights in the cases of facility usage or athletic team associations. 
While such rights may be implied according to the National Center for Transgender Equality, I 
still feel as if transgender rights can still be contested. Thus, the function of Title IX would be to 
ensure that transgender rights are protected not only through the use of gender identity, but 
gender expression as well. Having language in Title IX that bans the use of discriminatory 
language towards transgender people as well as eliminate discrimination based on speech or 
expression they choose to utilize is important to ensure transgender rights are properly included 
into Title IX. These terms can allow Title IX to be a pillar of transgender rights where the First 
Amendment of the Constitution may lack.    
 It is also said that the Fourteenth Amendment has some implications for transgender 
rights as well. This is because “the Fourteenth Amendment contains the Equal Protection Clause, 
which prevents state officials from denying any individual equal protection under the law” (U.S.  
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Const. amend. XIV, §1). This Equal Protection Clause would therefore mean that “individuals in 
the public school and higher education level may not treat transgender individuals differently 
than their counterparts” (Gonzales 7). The relationship between the Equal Protection Clause and 
Title IX is quite interesting. According to Melnick, there is actually a “close connection between 
Title IX and the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” (238). Because of this 
close connection, Melnick says that “Title IX resides in a “quasi-constitutional” twilight zone: in 
part simply a policy choice made by legislators and in part a legislative effort to enforce 
constitutional norms…” (238). This connection is partly true, especially with the expansion of 
the definition of sex. The Supreme Court first “expanded its reading of Equal Protection” which 
“invalidated not only laws containing explicit sex classifications, but policies allegedly based on 
“animus” against sexual minorities” (Melnick 239). After the expansion of sex occurred 
regarding the Equal Protection Clause, Melnick then says on page 239 that “these constitutional 
arguments migrated to interpretation of Title IX, which also covers private schools not subject to 
the Fourteenth Amendment.” Therefore, while the Equal Protection Clause, in theory, provides 
equal protection to all individuals under its jurisprudence, its history of expansion pertains to sex 
discrimination, and does not explicitly mention gender identity ( Melnick 239). Thus, while the 
Equal Protection law says it protects from discrimination, transgender rights may not be at its 
forefront if it primarily deals with sex discrimination, which, as this paper has previously stated, 
the definition of sex and gender as we understand it now is quite different. While the Equal 
Protection Clause has expanded the definition of sex, I am unsure if it is enough to say that this 
expansion alone will protect transgender individuals. This is another reason why Title IX must  
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include the term gender identity if the policy decides to be inclusive towards people who are 
transgender. If the term gender identity itself is not in the Equal Protection Clause, then it might 
give room for people to argue that it only protects individuals under a rigid understanding of sex, 
as opposed to expanding it to gender identity. This is why it is necessary that Title IX expands its 
definitions, so transgender individuals can one hundred percent rely on a document and policy 
that will protect them instead of just hoping it has expanded enough to include them.  
Conclusion 
 The way this project started is actually very different from how it turned out. Originally, I 
thought I would focus on other aspects of Title IX, such as women in athletics or sexual assault. 
However, once I learned about all the injustices pertaining to transgender individuals and Title 
IX, I knew I wanted to shed light on this issue, since it does not always receive a lot of attention 
in the media. Thus, I have concluded that there is no basis to exclude transgender individuals 
from Title IX. As displayed by the contention with North Carolina’s law, there are seldom any 
issues that would prove any statistical significance for having bathrooms stick with biological 
sex. Additionally, after careful analysis of the argument of the Plaintiffs and Defendants in the 
Soule v. CT Association of Schools case, it shows that having transgender individuals compete in 
athletic categories proves to be consistent with the three part test, and does not significantly 
reduce opportunities for biological females. Ultimately, the role of Title IX in order to ensure 
transgender rights is twofold. First, Title IX must make a shift from the use of sex to gender 
identity. While the definition of sex can be expanded, there comes a point where expansion can 
only go so far, which calls for a new term entirely. This is in order to ensure that transgender  
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individuals are protected under Title IX, since it can be argued that the definition of sex should 
revert back to biological, but the introduction of an entirely new term cannot be heavily 
contested since it is a completely different definition than biological sex. Next, it is important 
that Title IX functions to create a uniform federal policy so there is no confusion among 
individual states. As I stated throughout this paper, having transgender athletic policies be 
different across states can become confusing, especially in cross state competitions. A uniform 
federal policy will allow rules and stipulations to remain the same, no matter where the athlete 
competes in the country. Thus, these changes, coupled with the other recommendations I have 
made, will allow Title IX to become more inclusive of transgender individuals. The right to a 
bathroom and to compete in athletics should not be dependent on a social construct, and as 
society evolves, Title IX must evolve as well.  
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